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A hypothesis about the neurobiological bases of drive, drive reduction and will in addictive
illness is presented. Drive reduction seems to require both SEEKING and gratiﬁcation.Will
is the everyday term for our experience of drives functioning within us. Addictive drugs
take over the will by altering neurotransmission in the SEEKING system. As a result of
this biological change, psychological defenses are arrayed that allow partial gratiﬁcation
and reduce anxiety about the consequences of drug use. Repeated partial gratiﬁcation
of the addictive drive creates a cathexis to the drug and the drug seller. It also keeps
the addicted person in a permanent state of SEEKING. The cathexis to the drug and drug
seller creates a difﬁcult situation for psychoanalytic therapists.The actively addicted patient
will have one set of feelings for the analyst, and a split off set of feelings for the drug
dealer. Addictive neuroses, which feature a split transference, are contrasted with Freud’s
concept of transference and narcissistic neuroses. For treatment of an actively addicted
patient, the treater must negotiate the split transference. By analyzing the denial system
the relationship with the drug dealer ends and the hostility involved in addictive behavior
enters the transference where it can be interpreted. Selling drugs that take over the will is
a lucrative enterprise.The addictive drug industry, about the size of the oil and gas industry
worldwide, produces many patients in need of treatment.The marketers of addictive drugs
understand the psychology of inducing initial ingestion of the drugs, and of managing their
addicted populations.The neuropsychoanalytic understanding of addictionmight be used to
create more effective public health interventions to combat this morbid and mortal illness.
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INTRODUCTION
Toxoplasma gondii, a single-celled protozoan parasite,manipulates
the brain of the rat to shift their response to cat odor from defen-
sive to sexual attraction (House et al., 2011). Toxoplasma in the
environment gain entry into the rat by skin contact. They multi-
ply in brain and muscle tissue. The immune response of the rat
results in cyst formation.
The pathways for the defensive and reproductive pathways run
in parallel from the olfactory bulb to the medial amygdala and
hypothalamus in close anatomical proximity (House et al., 2011).
Toxoplasma cysts elaborate tyrosine beta hydroxylase, the rate-
limiting enzyme in the pathway from the tyrosine in food to
dopamine. Prandovszky et al. (2011) found that infected brain
cell cultures had a threefold increase in dopamine compared to
uninfected cells. Alteration in brain dopamine results in a subtle
shift in behavior. Rats infected with T. gondii shift their behavior
from fearing/avoiding cats to approaching them as if they were
desirable mates. The rats get eaten by the cats.
The organism makes its way into its preferred host, the cat,
by taking over the brain of the rat (House et al., 2011). The rat
behaves normally in all ways except that instead of avoiding cats,
it seeks them out. This behavioral change is not for the survival of
the rat, but for the survival of the T. gondii parasite.
The goal of this communication is to ask the question about
whether a homologous process in the human has to do with
the sale of addictive drugs. Like the process involving T. gondii,
the mechanism would involve the dopaminergic system. The
conclusion would be that, like the rat serving the Toxoplasma
organism, the behavior of a human taking addictive drugs into
their brain has to do with the beneﬁt of the drug seller; even at the
cost of the life of the addicted human.
There is almost no clinical material in this paper. Psychoan-
alytic and neuropsychoanalytic treatment of addiction has been
extensively presented by the author in numerous clinical papers
covering alcohol (Johnson, 1992, 1993, 2003a, 2011), marijuana
(Jones et al., 2005), cocaine (Johnson, 2009a), heroin (Johnson,
1999, 2001, 2010), nicotine (Johnson, 2003a), and drug dreams
(Johnson, 2001, 2003b, 2006, 2012) including papers describing
whole psychoanalyses with 9-year follow ups after treatment for
alcohol addiction (Johnson, 2011) and heroin addiction (Johnson,
2010). After 10 mostly clinical papers, this discussion focuses on
the general implications of concepts derived from the conﬂuence
of neuroscience and clinical psychoanalytic work.
DRIVE AND CATHEXIS: KEY CONCEPTS FOR ADDICTION
NEUROPSYCHOANALYSIS
Drive and cathexis are concepts that originated during Freud’s
pre-psychoanalytic period of neuroscience research (Compton,
1983a). Since then, the ﬁeld has struggled with the problem of
how to combine clinical observational data with theoretical con-
structs that involve a completely unconscious aspect ofmotivation.
Freud originally identiﬁed drive as the engine of relatedness, the
primary conceptual device in psychoanalysis for explaining mind,
body, and environment relationships (Compton,1983b). For some
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psychoanalysts, the concept of drive has taken on the extreme
opposite quality. For example, Aron (1999, p. 259) stated, “. . .The
classical drive/structure metapsychology . . . narrows our view of
people, deprives them of subjectivity, and reduces them to objects.
This limitation is true of any asocial, ‘one-person’ psychology.”
On the other hand, drive or motivation has become a focus of
the neuroscience approaches to addiction. For example, Kalivas
and Volkow (2005, p. 1403) stated, “As the pursuit for the neural
basis of addiction advances, it is clear that the search intimately
involves understanding the neurobiological basis of motivation
and choice for biological reward, such as food and sex, as well as
more cognitively and experientially based reward, such as friend-
ship, family and social status.”Neuroscientists working in the ﬁeld
ofmotivation and volitionhave varying opinions as to the origin of
motivation. Some reviews (Zhu, 2003; Haggard, 2008) look to cor-
tical pathways as the initiators of actions. Others (Berridge, 2004;
Kalivas and Volkow, 2005) focus on the dopaminergic pathway
that leads from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain
through the lateral hypothalamus to the nucleus accumbens as
the central structural pathway involved in motivation. This is the
SEEKING system (Panksepp, 1998).
In neuropsychoanalyst Jaak Panksepp’s model, derived from
his extensive experimentation with animals, the SEEKING system
has the capacity to shift activity from one to another motivational
system, depending on internal and environmental inputs. This
supraordinate ﬂexibility is exactly what Berridge (2004, p.201)
cited against the drivemodel. “Themost dramatic evidence against
dedicated drive neurons came from studies of motivation by elec-
trical brain stimulation. . . For example, if one stimulated the
lateral hypothalamusof different rats,many ratsmight showeating
behavior. But a few rats might show drinking behavior, a few show
sexual behavior, or others show predatory aggressive behavior,
depending on the availability of stimuli and on the disposition of
the individual rat being stimulated.” This phenomenon, that var-
ious motivated behaviors are prompted by one system, is exactly
the concept of drive; a constant pressure from inside the organism
to do work (Freud, 1915; Shevrin, 1997; 2003).
In an earlier contribution (Johnson, 2008) I considered addic-
tion researchers Robinson and Berridge (1993), Berridge and
Robinson (2003) distinction between “wanting” and “liking.” In
that paper I posited that Panksepp’s SEEKING system is the same
system that Freud (1915) hypothesized to exist deep in the brain,
libidinal drive. My assumption was not based on a historical study.
I was and amusing Freud’s thinking only because, inmany cases, it
is still the most perspicacious description integrating nomothetic
neuroscience with ideographic psychoanalytic observation. I sug-
gested that Freud’s concept of the pleasure principlewas connected
to Panksepp’s many observations of endorphin/opioid function in
the brain (Panksepp, 1981, 1990, 1998, 1999; Panksepp and Watt,
2011, etc.). Importantly, the pleasure system is tied to the drive sys-
tem via opioid receptors in the VTA and nucleus accumbens shell
(NAS), where they potentiate glutamatergic and dopaminergic
processes that intensify drive.
Using the SEEKING system to stand in for Freud’s drive sys-
tem obviates the objection that it excludes a focus on relatedness,
since SEEKING and other instinctual systems, CARE, PLAY, LUST,
and PANIC (Panksepp, 1998), offer a biologically based andmuch
more articulated set of instinctual drivers toward forming rela-
tionships. It gives us a model for clinical work that preserves
Freud’s concept of libidinal drive while responding to Aron’s con-
cern that drive produces an “asocial, one person psychology.”We
SEEK relationships. Panksepp’s neuropsychoanalytic formulation
of instinct, which is based in animal research, solves problems
which could not be understood by an approach that is purely
based on clinical experiences with patients.
Freud described “cathexis” as an initially mobile instinctual
energy that could be bound to persons, body parts, ideas, or
dream elements (Freud, 1920, p.34). In the 21st century we
have information that allows us to describe the neuroscience of
libidinal investment (Johnson, 2008). Dopamine is released in
the nucleus accumbens of mother rats following pup exposure.
VTA or nucleus accumbens (drive/SEEKING system) lesions dis-
rupt maternal behavior (Insel, 2003). Dopamine (D1) receptors
are necessary for rats to develop place conditioning for opioids.
Opioid receptor antagonists block the development of partner
preference in rats after mating. Both drive and pleasure need to
be functioning to produce attachment. Without the drive of the
dopaminergic system, there can be no libidinal investment. In
order to form a sexual bond, rats have to remember that mating
was a pleasant, not just a driven, experience.
Other neural systems are involved when animals come to prefer
speciﬁc mates. Medial orbital frontal, amygdalar, and hippocam-
pal memory inputs are involved. Hormonal systems interact
with drive and pleasure systems. Oxytocin potentiates endorphin
release duringmating. Oxytocin is essential for partner preference,
as has been demonstrated repeatedly in experiments comparing
the prairie vole, which has an oxytocin system, with the montane
vole, which does not (Insel, 2003; Johnson, 2008). Prairie voles
form sexual partnerships, montane voles do not. In summary,
cathexis has to do with an ensemble of drive, pleasure, memory,
hormones – but there is no cathexis without drive.
One conclusion of the 2008 paper was that versions of the 1993
Robinson and Berridge distinction between wanting and liking
had already been discovered by previous investigators. Freud had
described it in 1920 in his essay, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle.”
Panksepp had shown the distinction between wanting and liking
in his papers on the SEEKING and endorphin systems (Panksepp,
1981, 1990, 1998; Panksepp and Watt, 2011, etc.). But the main
conclusion of the paper was that in biological or “physical” (John-
son, 1999, 2003b) addiction, addictive drugs had changed the drive
system so that they were urgently wanted; whether intoxication
was pleasant or not. This conclusion is an elaboration of the con-
cept that is generally accepted in the neuroscience community that
addiction begins with an alteration in the mesolimbic dopamine
system (Hyman et al., 2006; Koob and Volkow, 2010). Addiction
represents the usurpation of neural processes that underlie pursuit
of food, water, sex, and relationships. Implicit was an idea about
cathexis that will be developed below; cathexis for drugs or drug
sellers can complete with cathexis for people who are loved.
DRIVE REDUCTION AND DRIVE
Why is the concept of drive reduction dead? I believe it is because
Freud’s thinking about this topic has been ignored by current neu-
roscientists. For example, when Berridge (2004) discussed why
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drive reduction had been disproved by animal experiments, he
explained that animals who only SEEK will do it forever, and
animals who are only gratiﬁed, for example by having caloric
requirements satisﬁed by gastric feeding, were still motivated to
pursue food. An important source of his confusion is the behavior-
ist term“reward,”which conﬂates the concepts of SEEKING/drive
and gratiﬁcation. It is only by separating these two components of
drive reduction that we can understand how they operate.
Freud gave the fullest description of drive reduction in his 1923
paper, “The Ego and the Id” (Freud, 1923, pp. 21–23).
“Internal perceptions yield sensations of processes arising in
the most diverse and certainly also the deepest strata of the men-
tal apparatus. . .they are more primordial, more elementary than
sensations arising externally. . .
Sensations of a pleasurable nature do not have anything inher-
ently impelling about them, whereas unpleasurable ones have it
in the highest degree. The latter impel toward change, toward
discharge, and that is why we interpret unpleasure as implying a
heightening and pleasure a lowering of energetic cathexis. . .
This something behaves like a repressed impulse. It can exert
driving force without the ego noticing the compulsion. . . Not
until there is a resistance to the compulsion, a hold-up in the
discharge reaction, does the ‘something’ at once become conscious
as unpleasure. . .
The part played by word-presentations now becomes per-
fectly clear. By their interposition internal thought-processes are
made into perceptions. . . We are all ‘lived’ by unknown and
uncontrollable forces.”
The ego’s relationship with the id, “Is like a man on horseback,
who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse. . .
Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from the horse, is obliged to
guide it where it wants to go.”
Drive reduction involves a combination of the rapacious, insis-
tent drive building to a state where it demands satisfaction, and the
pleasure of complete gratiﬁcation. Both must operate sequentially
for the drive to be reduced. Drive alone, in the case of addiction the
constant drive for addictive drugs, is only increased by exposure
to drugs. Once addicted, exposure to alcohol, cocaine, nicotine, or
opioids causes a brief diminution of desire, followed by an increase
of the urgent wish for the drug.
In the case of self-stimulation of the drive center (lateral
hypothalamus), animals wired to be able to activate this area will
push the “on” button constantly until they die. The unpleasure of
brieﬂy relieved drive apparently causes endless fruitless attempts
to achieve drive reduction. In contrast, pure gratiﬁcation without
activation of SEEKING is in the end unsatisfying. Pornography
addiction may be an example of gratiﬁcation that is endlessly
unsatisfying. Masturbation may be unsatisfying because it grat-
iﬁes sexually without engaging the SEEKING system. Apparently,
animals or humans who can’t reduce drive by combining SEEK-
ING and satisfaction sometimes endlessly engage in activities that
activate only one or the other half of drive reduction.
We have taken as a hypothesis that drive involves activation
of the ventral tegmental dopaminergic SEEKING system run-
ning from the midbrain through the lateral hypothalamus to the
nucleus accumbens. A second hypothesis is that drive reduction
requires both activation of the SEEKING system and gratiﬁcation;
food, sex, a relationship, something that requires work (Freud,
1915; Shevrin, 1997), and involves the complete relaxation of
gratiﬁcation. Addictive behaviors cause a brief and incomplete
reduction of drive that result in endless drug seeking. The Freudian
concept of will is necessary to understand how drive and drive
reduction operate in the individual to change behavior.
THE CONCEPT OF WILL
In the Project for a Scientiﬁc Psychology (aka “Psychology for
Neurologists”) Freud explained, “. . .in the interior. . .there arises
the impulsion which sustains all psychical activity. We know this
power as the will – the derivative of the drives” (quoted/translated
by Schmidt-Hellerau, 2001, p. 61). The experience of drives oper-
ating inside us can impel us to do things that we do not consciously
“want” to do. This often leads to an interpretation by the analyst
that certain behaviors are, “intentional but not conscious.” The
reasons that we do things are often not apparent to us.
In fact, the lay term “will power” sometimes seems to exist as
a denial of true intention. People will say things like, “I wanted
to eat the whole pint of ice cream, but I exercised will power and
only had half.” Or even less consciously, “I really wanted to stay
on my diet and I struggled not to eat all that ice cream, but I did
it anyway; I ate that ice cream against my will.”Much of the work
of psychoanalysis has to do with patients becoming conscious of
their real motives, what the true goals of their will is (Wheelis,
1956; The philosophical and psychoanalytic intersection of will
and drive was reviewed in Young and Brook, 1994).
As Freud said so presciently, it is the repeated stimulation of
neuronal pathways that leads to cathexis (Schmidt-Hellerau, 2001,
pp. 54–58). The process of facilitation of neuronal pathways, lead-
ing to structural changes in the brain, would nowadays be referred
to as long-term potentiation (Kandel, 2006). The combination of
experience and brain changes under the inﬂuence of neurotrans-
mitters, neuropeptides, and hormones leads to the development
of interests that are different for every person (Johnson, 2008).
In other words, inborn givens take shape and deﬁnition through
the interaction with the social environment and establish patterns
of maintaining contact and relatedness with others. This phe-
nomenon of modulation of cathexis by a combination of innate
biology, development, and experience means that every person is
a little different in their tastes. The urgent needs generated by the
drive system, once speciﬁc tastes in object and patterns of relat-
edness become ﬁxed, are matched up against external reality. The
degree of pleasure and fulﬁllment resulting from actualization of
one’s drives and cathexes lead to either gratiﬁcation or neurotic
frustration (Johnson, 2008). In the case where expression of will
leads to frustration, individuals feel that their life is not going
well and yet are often not be able to articulate where the problem
lies.
Interpretation of conﬂicts between conscious and unconscious
goals, often described as “neurotic conﬂict,” is the constant occu-
pation of any psychoanalyst. Meissner (2005, p. 28) discussed
“intrasystemic id conﬂicts” involving motivational systems. One
might love one’s mother consciously, and yet also wish to destroy
her unconsciously. Both urges could be described as id-driven.
This conﬂict generates anxiety – a signal that there is trouble in
a relationship (Freud, 1926; Watt and Panksepp, 2009). There is
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a conﬂict between the wish for additive drugs and the wish for
relationships. Both could be characterized as id-driven.
In a typically parallel neuropsychoanalytic way, the intrasys-
temic id conﬂict of addiction can be seen psychologically and
also neurobiologically. Psychologically, one might love one’s
mother consciously, and also unconsciously want to destroy her by
destroying oneself with heroin. The use of addictive drugs can be
understood as an unconscious expression of rage (Dodes, 1990).
Neurobiologically, the conﬂict has to do with a conﬂict between
urgently wanting a drug, and still wanting other goals of the drive
system including a relationship with one’s mother. The experience
that the mothers of heroin users are wildly upset while the heroin
user sees themselves is single-mindedly pursuing drug use, is an
everyday experience on an addiction treatment service.
HOW THE WILL IS TAKEN OVER BY ADDICTIVE CHEMICALS
There are only about 20 chemicals known to humans that alter the
drive system so as to create a newdrive (Johnson,2008). These sub-
stances: alcohol, nicotine, benzodiazepines, opioids, stimulants,
marijuana, phencyclidine, etc., all work by diverse mechanisms
(Nestler, 2005), but with the same uniform end result. They cause
sensitization of the ventral tegmental dopaminergic SEEKING
system to the chemical (Robinson and Berridge, 1993). After suf-
ﬁcient exposure to the chemical, the person begins to want the
drug; irrationally and insistently.
There is a triangle on the lower right half of Figure 1 which
shows the hypothesizedmechanismof physical addiction for stim-
ulant drugs. The corners of the triangle are the VTA, the NAS, and
the prefrontal cortex. Cocaine and methamphetamine increase
FIGURE 1 | Craving/dreaming pathways: Neurop, neuropeptides; GABA, gamma amino butyric acid, CB, cannabinoid.
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dopaminergic neural activation from the VTA directly to the NAS
(Niehaus et al., 2009) by blocking the dopamine reuptake trans-
porter protein. Nicotine has receptors on the VTA, and stimulates
activating signaling from the amygdala (Nestler, 2005).
There is a tonic brake on the VTA created by GABAergic
inhibition by a set of interneurons. This set of interneurons
is represented by a box directly to the left of the VTA box
that occupies the center of Figure 1. Opioids act as a brake
on an inhibitory system involving GABAergic interneurons that
slow dopamine neurotransmission from the VTA to the NAS
(Nestler, 2005). Removing this inhibition from the VTA results in
increased dopamine activation of the NAS. Marijuana’s tetrahy-
drocannabinol lodges in endocannabinoid receptors in inhibitory
GABAergic VTA interneurons, inhibiting this brake so that there
is increased dopaminergic stimulation of the NAS (Fattore et al.,
2008). The mechanism for alcohol and benzodiazepines may
be that in withdrawal from these GABAergic drugs, there is a
lessening of GABAergic inhibition of the VTA, and dopamine
neurotransmission is increased (Enoch, 2008).
The mechanism of physical addiction for every addictive drug
is that dopamine neurotransmission from the VTA to the NAS is
altered. Craving, the psychological manifestation of dopaminer-
gic drive activity in this pathway (Shevrin, 1997), is induced by
drug exposure. After repeated exposure to the addictive chemicals
that produce dopaminergic activation of the SEEKING system,
the chemicals become wanted, desired, craved; just like so called,
“natural reinforcers,” food, water, sex, and relationships.
The pathway does not end with the NAS. As seen in Figure 1,
there are limbic and frontal centers connectedwith this subcortical
pathway. As the effects of stimulation in the subcortical path-
way cause long-term potentiation of higher centers, and drugs are
wanted, drug cues recognized at pathways involving amygdalar,
hippocampal, and frontal activation provoke neural ﬁring, and
downgoing glutamatergic pathways increase craving by stimulat-
ing more dopamine release. The higher centers notice possible
availability of drugs, and turn up craving.
The pathways in Figure 1 allow for the concept that there
are two mechanisms of induction of craving; the “upper” and
the “downer” pathways. The terms “upper” and “downer” are
street language for whether the user experiences a drug as acti-
vating or relaxing. These terms may also reﬂect a difference in
neurobiological action. The upper pathway, activated by cocaine,
methamphetamine, and nicotine, directly increases ﬁring from the
VTA to the NA. The downer pathway is less direct. The interneu-
ron braking system is deactivated, leading to increased activation
of VTA to NAS dopamine. This would account for the fact that
the upper drugs cause drug craving so commonly and are harder
to become abstinent from, while downer drugs such as mari-
juana, alcohol, opioids, or benzodiazepines provoke addiction
with lower frequency. When drugs in the downer group are used
for recreational or medical reasons, most users do not become
addicted.
Persons whose brains have been changed by addictive drugs
must obtain the chemical or they are punished by ferocious
unpleasure if there is, “A resistance to the compulsion, a hold-
up in the discharge reaction.” These chemicals are used to take
over the will of the victim. For example, one might say that the
person who is smoking a cigarette while having fantasies of dying
of cancer, heart disease, or emphysema is not following their own
will, but actually enacting the desire of the cigarette manufacturer,
who is selling the cigarettes.
We might say that human children, who begin using nicotine
on average in the United States at age 13, are controlled by a pro-
cess homologous to rats infected by toxoplasmosis. Their behavior
has been subtly altered by a change in dopamine/SEEKING. They
behave in almost every way as if they are themselves. But inhaling
nicotine, along with particles that can produce cancer or ruin the
lung’s ability to obtain oxygen, is in the service of the cigarette
sellers.
DRUG-INDUCED RELATIONSHIPS
By using these drugs, individuals begin to “want” them for no
reason other than brain changes. By associative learning, the pur-
veyors of the drugs are also wanted. The state of drug craving is
intensely emotional, urgent, energetic, searching for a means of
gratiﬁcation. By providing the drug, the seller becomes wanted,
cathected.
Relationships with drug providers can have a yearning, roman-
tic cast. As one patient told me, despite being in treatment for
addiction, and sober, “I love my dealer!” A patient with atten-
tion deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), cocaine and nicotine
addiction suspected I would proﬁt from having him buy a pre-
scription for the antidepressant bupropion, used to treat ADHD
and nicotine dependence. This suggests a transference from his
drug sellers to me, with their/my drug as the intermediary caus-
ing a cathexis. A third patient, early in his treatment for opioid
addiction, called the drug dealer to whom he had paid $200,000,
his “best friend.” When in emotional distress, my patient refused
to call my cell phone, but rather, kept relapsing because he would
call his drug dealer’s cell phone.
There are secondary changes in the brain as addiction pro-
gresses. Later brain changes involve routinization of drug SEEK-
ING by reorganization of pathways (Koob and Volkow, 2010)
involving the nucleus accumbens core (Everitt and Robbins, 2005;
Kalivas and Volkow, 2005) and diminished prefrontal inhibition
(Bechara, 2005), especially if there are losses of brain tissue due
to the various degrading effects of these drugs (reviewed in John-
son, 2009b). The longer addiction goes on, the harder it is to
recover. Initiating brain changes with one drug results in faster
adaptation with craving for a second addictive drug (Robinson
and Berridge, 2000). For example, individuals who start smoking
cigarettes before the age of 15 are 80 times more likely to use illicit
drugs (Lai et al., 2000).
Exposure to addictive drugs can cause brain changes that result
in permanent craving. This makes perfect sense if you think of
the reason that drives are built into animals. We need to have a
steady pressure to obtain items in the environment that are related
to survival. If we learn where these items are, or how to recognize
their possible availability, we need to have our craving turned on at
that moment when we recognize availability cues so that we inten-
sify our search for the proximal, life-supporting item, no matter
how long ago we learned about the linkage between cue and drive
goal. After learning about the constant availability of reward in
the environment, SEEKING them can become a more automatic,
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unconscious behavior – modulated in the nucleus accumbens
core.
However, this survival mechanism has its drawbacks. One
Freudian discovery was that this constant pressure to act can come
into conﬂict with other considerations that have to do with living
in a social environment. The original paradigm of the Oedipus
Complex was the conﬂict between the sexual drive and the pres-
ence of a larger, older, same-gender parent who was in the way of
the child’s closeness with the parent of the opposite gender (Freud,
1909).
Conﬂict is also generated regarding drug-seeking. Once addic-
tive drugs get entrained into the drive pathway, there is a constant
pressure to act to procure the drug experience again, no matter
how unpleasant and dysfunctional the consequences. This is no
different conceptually than yearning for a parent of the opposite
gender when one is too young to effectively or safely compete. Lust
can be dangerous; whether for love or drugs. Life provokes internal
conﬂict.
Drives are so deeply unconscious that it is hard to experience
them directly. Describing “craving” is a difﬁcult task (reviewed in
Johnson, 2012). Craving seems absent 1 min, overwhelming the
next. An unconscious basal statemay be altered by the provocation
of dopamine neurotransmission in the VTA/nucleus accumbens
pathway when drug cues activate frontal or limbic centers. With
a drug cue or intense emotion, the previously unconscious drive
enters awareness.
Finally, just as food, water, sex, and relational needs provoke
dreams, so does the hunger for drugs (Johnson, 2001). Drug
dreams are a unique aspect of physical addiction (Johnson,2003b).
Craving for drugs that is not conscious can be made conscious by
the interpretation of dreams (Johnson, 2001).
PSYCHOLOGICAL SEQUELAE OF PHYSICAL ADDICTION
As soon as the drug has had sufﬁcient impact on the neural path-
ways shown in Figure 1, there is a reorganization of thinking. We
are in a position to actually see the impact of physical factors in
the brain on psychology by talking to persons who have under-
gone this change. The victim of this process begins to have the
experience described above that they become uncomfortable as
the drug washes out of their brain. The addicted person has that
inner sensation that they absolutely must havemore of the drug to
ward off the unpleasure of craving. They suffer from endless drug
SEEKING. Persons with alcohol dependence show up at the bar
at 8 am. Persons with heroin dependence knock on their dealer’s
door early in the morning. Cigarette smokers get off planes and
have a cigarette before they do anything else. The unpleasure of
craving is so intense that addicted individuals do everything they
can to get rid of it. But it always comes right back.
Defenses are arrayed by the ego tomodulate the new drive state.
Consistent with Freud’s metaphor of horse and rider (quoted in
the drive reduction and drive section), the newly addicted person
urgently wants to procure and use their drug. Their ego is aware of
the potential liabilities in using it again. The ego deploys a series
of explanations about why using the drug again is, “OK.”
Psychological defenses reduce anxiety at the expense of obscur-
ing reality. It is customary in the ﬁeld of addiction to talk about
“denial.” However, there is no reason that a single defense, denial,
would be arrayed against a drive. There are as many defenses
arrayed against thedrive for addictive chemicals as there are against
any other drive. For example, an addicted personmight use projec-
tion of responsibility,“I’m using because she/he treatedme badly.”
The defense could be minimization, “Going to work late because I
was hung over from drinking isn’t such a big deal.”
Each person’s denial system is their own unique set of expla-
nations about why they should keep using their addictive drug(s).
To the outside observer, their denial system, the particular set
of psychological defenses set up to protect continued dangerous
drug use, makes no sense. This is because the defenses are arrayed
against internal stimuli. The observer cannot feel the drive to use
the drug. In fact, one of the problems of identifying with addicted
individuals is that the observer or psychoanalyst usually has not
had the patient’s experience of pursuing drugs. The best way to
make an empathic identiﬁcation is to imagine one of the basic
drive goals, such as food. One can think about how hard it is
to lose weight by tolerating the urge to eat things that are off
the weight-loss diet. One will notice that defenses are arrayed to
protect eating foods that are not consistent with the diet, just as
addicted persons have defenses about using when they also wish
to be abstinent.
The denial system of the physically addicted person is based
on their craving for the drug, and on their allegiance to the seller
of their drug. This may sound like an odd claim; isn’t the drug
the object? The answer to this question puts us back where Freud
started. Human relationships are grounded in the gratiﬁcation of
drives. In adult sexual relationships, attraction leads to increasing
involvement, sexual gratiﬁcation, cathexis, and loyalty.
We can understand howdrive precedes cathexis in relationships
if we observe the SEEKING system functioning with the drive
for addictive drugs. Persons who become addicted develop an
allegiance to the seller of the drug. Cigarette manufacturers are
keenly aware of cathexis. Their goal is tomake the user of cigarettes
fall in love with the brand that contains their nicotine.
In the United States, about 20million persons buy illegal drugs,
and it is almost unheard of for an addicted person to turn in their
drug dealer. In part this is because the drug users fear that they
will be killed if they alert police that their dealer is selling drugs.
But mostly it comes from cathexis. Addicted persons have warm
feelings toward their dealers; even as they may also fear being
killed by them. Warm feelings that cover a fear of being killed is
the defense, “idealization.”
Craving provokes idealization. Idealization of the drug is a con-
stant and indispensable part of denial. This defense, as described
by Klein (1957), involves fear of the object (drug/drug seller).
Addicted people are terriﬁed by their behaviors. Yet this informa-
tion is unavailable to themconsciously. Their conscious experience
is that, whatever the drug, its use is wonderful. People who
smoke cigarettes are staying slim, being free to defy authority,
expressing their emotions, and their sexuality – just like cigarette
smoking actors do in the movies. Some persons addicted to
alcohol pride themselves on how much they can drink. Some
users of heroin feel that it is a cooler drug than any other. For
addictive drugs that are legal, advertising has the theme of ideal
behavior; that the drug or alcohol is connected with social domi-
nance or pleasure in sports or relationships. I summarize various
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aspects of this idealization in Table 1 (explained at length in
Johnson, 1993, 1998).
Idealization, like laughter, is catching. This may be an underly-
ing dynamic of the social nature of the spread of cigarette smoking
(Christakis and Fowler, 2008). When a 12-year-old child sees a
16-year-old child smoking a cigarette, the 16-year-old is using
idealization internally to defend against their panic about see-
ing how out of control their behavior is and to defend against
their perception of physical changes such as cough and short-
ness of breath. This idealization is represented to the 12-year-old
interpersonally. The 16-year-old idealizes their ability to smoke
a cigarette without having to cough when the irritating smoke
enters their lungs, an aspect of tolerance. They communicate to
the 12-year-old that smoking is appealing, “cool.” As a result, the
12-year-old victim will tolerate the aversive aspects of smoking
until tolerance, craving, and denial set in. This victim is then in a
position to pass the addiction on to another young victim. Other
drugs work by the same mechanism. It doesn’t matter what the
chemical is, the defense of idealization is uniform for addictive
drugs.
TREATMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE
NEUROPSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPTS OF DRIVE, DRIVE
REDUCTION, AND WILL
Freud had a set of conditions that he felt had to do with the distri-
bution of libido by the ego. In the “transference neuroses” libido
was available to be cathected to the analyst. This was ideal for psy-
choanalytic treatment. In the “narcissistic neuroses” (Freud, 1917,
pp. 420–423) libido was withdrawn from objects, therefore from
the analyst, and psychoanalytic treatment was impossible. As a
hypothesis, we could add to this list “addictive neuroses.” Some
libido is cathected to the drug/drug seller, some to other people –
including the analyst. There is a splitting of the transference, just
as there is a splitting of the patient’s experience (Table 1). What
the analyst observes is that the patient hasmany ordinary dynamic
interactions in the hour, but keeps the addictive urges outside the
hour.
The patient does with the analyst (of course) what they do with
all relationships. The patient very much wants to be engaged with
the analyst, but has another cathexis for her/his libido that has
nothing to do with the analyst. The patient’s conscious experience
is that behaviors having to do with obtaining and using drugs have
little to do with other relationships. Their libidinal investment is
dissociated into the part that cares deeply about the analyst and
the part that cares deeply about obtaining and using drugs.
One result of this situation is the familiar complaint of some
addicted individuals who claim that their psychoanalysis did noth-
ing to change their addiction. This is because the patient felt that
their addiction had nothing to do with their analyst (their true
experience) and their analyst was not in a position to hear about
the effects of the addictive drug. In these psychoanalyses, the
patient and analyst worked on their relationship, while the rela-
tionship with the drug/drug dealer remained unexamined. The
unintended result of this approach can be that the patient who
has completed such a psychoanalysis is even more adept at hav-
ing relationships with people while using their drug addictively.
Lying midway between the transference neuroses and the narcis-
sistic neuroses, the addictive neuroses require some alterations of
technique in order for the patient to beneﬁt from treatment.
What can an analyst do when faced with an addictive neurosis
that has a split cathexis/transference? The answer has something
to do with developing conscious conﬂict about drug use within
the relationship with the analyst. The patient knows that they are
in trouble because of their relationship with the drug and with
the drug dealer, but not consciously. The patient knows that they
cannot both fully engage in the relationship with the analyst, and
stay involved with the drug/drug dealer, but not consciously. The
relationship with the drug/drug dealer is based on a system of
beliefs which make perfect sense to the patient because they exist
to diminish the anxiety about using a drug that is creating damage
and may result in death. For example, many persons who are
addicted to nicotine will say things like, “Sure cigarettes may kill
me. We all have to die some time!”
Therefore, in many cases the analyst will have to divide the
treatment into two phases. In the ﬁrst, the transference is not
explored because it is split. The analyst appreciates that attack-
ing the relationship with the drug/drug dealer is not going to
work. A strong cathexis has been established after many expe-
riences of great unpleasure relieved by drugs and/or alcohol. The
analyst limits their interventions to clariﬁcations and confronta-
tions that intensify conscious conﬂict between the wish to use and
the symptoms of addiction that ensue from use. By using these
non-transference interpretations, the analyst works on the denial
system. It is only after the patient has moved through the “stages
of change” by virtue of increasing dismay about the consequences
of drug and/or alcohol use, and stopped using, that the treatment
enters the second phase.
Addicted persons are like children in a divorce who don’t want
to tell one parent what is going on with the other. They feel an
alliance with both, but understand that the allegiance to one is
Table 1 | Addictive idealization/splitting.
The addiction
Experiencing ego/psychic reality Observing ego/external reality
Facilitates relationships Makes close relationships difﬁcult (wards off fear of control/merger)
Creates pleasure Creates pain
Gives a sense of omnipotence Makes one impaired
Is a rebellion that creates a feeling of separateness Is a compliance with the attacking introject that undercuts the use of aggression needed to
be separate
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essentially disloyal to the other. Just as one divorced parent often
does not hear what the child is doing with the other, the analyst
oftendoesnot hearwhat is goingonwith thedrugdealer. Not being
open and honest is the result. This formulation allows the treating
clinician to shift from, “My patient lied to me,” to, “I encountered
a split transference.” The ﬁrst reaction might produce anger, the
second interest, and a feeling of a technical challenge.
For any psychotherapy treatment, a key ingredient of healing
has to do with the therapeutic alliance (Nissen-Lie et al., 2010).
If addiction therapists use non-speciﬁc or intuitive interventions
that arewarmly related, outcomesmight be the samedespite differ-
ent theoretical orientations. Therapists who intuit the underlying
neuropsychodynamics more accurately might have better out-
comes, but beunable to explainwhy. For the therapistwhowas able
to explain what they were doing with neuroscience and metapsy-
chology, there might be better outcomes – but this hypothesis has
not been empirically tested.
An innovative psychoanalytic treatment of alcohol use disor-
ders in borderline personality disorder, Dynamic Deconstructive
Psychotherapy, subjects showed a signiﬁcant decrease in heavy
drinking accompanied by complete cessation of other drug use.
In contrast, subjects in optimal community care received more
treatment but showed increased drinking and increased drug use
over the 30 month post-treatment follow up study (Gregory et al.,
2010). This kind of naturalistic comparison of outcomes for
patients who are initially randomized into neuropsychoanalytic
or conventional treatment groups would be a way to empirically
test the concepts described here.
Talking with patients during active addiction, one becomes
aware that use is procedural, automatic, unconsidered. The tech-
nique of the ﬁrst phase of neuropsychoanalytic treatment of
addiction is to sharpen the conscious conﬂict between the drive
derivative that is in evidence during use, but not conscious, and
the ego’s alarm at the reality of the consequences. Caring is com-
municated. Denial is undercut. We must remember the earlier
quote from Freud regarding the function of word-representation
as the mechanism by which internal unconscious thought pro-
cesses are made into perceptions. In order for the addicted person
to continue to be actively addicted, they can’t think about what
they are doing. Talking about one’s urge to use drugs and alco-
hol takes place within a relationship. As Freud said about word
presentation, “It is like the theorem that all knowledge has its
origin in external perception.. . . A hypercathexis of the pro-
cess of thinking takes place, thoughts are actually perceived –
as if they came from without – and are consequently held to
be true” (Freud, 1923, p. 23). Talking about craving and addic-
tive behaviors changes them fromprecontemplative unformulated
experience to more conscious problems that require work in
psychotherapy.
If the goal of the ego is to serve the id, like the rider guiding
the horse where it wants to go, then the patient will resist talking
about their addiction because it disrupts the ability to go get drugs.
In this way, the powerful urges created by exposure to addictive
chemicals debilitate ego functioning. This impairment is often
experienced by the analyst as having a patient who says, “Nothing
comes tomind,”or who does not arrive for treatment. Recognition
of this injury to ego functioning by an altered drive state can be
ameliorated by interpreting the lack of association or the missing
of appointments as manifestations of craving. For example, the
analyst may respond to a patient who says, “Nothing comes to
mind,” with, “Perhaps you are thinking about using drugs, and
you are trying NOT to talk to me about that.”
The psychoanalyst should not take idealization at face value.
A patient who romances their addictive behavior can be lis-
tened to until the negative/frightened side of the thinking
emerges. The alternative to addictive idealization is conscious
ambivalence.
What happens when the denial system is interpreted sufﬁ-
ciently so that the patient stops using? My observation is that
the split transference collapses, and the issues that had been
diverted into addictive drug use enter the transference. I reported,
“The psychoanalysis of a man with active alcoholism,” where
the end of alcoholic drinking during days per week psycho-
analysis resulted in intense hostility entering the transference
(Johnson, 1992). In the second phase of treatment, aggres-
sive derivatives (Dodes, 1990) that had been expressed through
the use of alcohol entered the transference relationship, where
they were explored and ameliorated (Johnson, 1992). For some
patients, when addictive behavior stops, the analyst has to be
prepared for a siege of hostility that had never been in evi-
dence during the ﬁrst phase of treatment. The addictive behaviors
had expressed the hostility and displaced it away from the
transference.
I reported the 4 days per week psychoanalysis of a man with
heroin addiction where cessation of heroin use resulted in an
intense anaclitic depression entering the transference (Johnson,
2010). The patient went from a cool, unrelated person to an
intensely needy and frightened person. The amelioration of the
anaclitic depression within the transference resulted in a 9-year
absence of addictive symptoms at the time of the report.
PUBLIC HEALTH APPLICATIONS OF THE
NEUROPSYCHOANLYTIC MODEL
Psychoanalysis has been since its early days a theory of culture
as well as of the individual mind (Paul, 2011). The discussion so
far has described an illness that is based in a brain system that
is deeply unconscious. Items that impinge on the drive pathway
are “needed.” Addictive drugs are a commodity. The property
of these drugs, that they take over the will by creating dyspho-
ria/craving/unpleasure during abstinence, means that addicted
persons will do just about anything to obtain their drug.
Howwidespread is addiction, and howmuchmoney is involved
in addiction? Let’s think about the number of brains involved. 26%
(World Health Organization [WHO], 2010) of the world’s popu-
lation of almost seven billion smokes cigarettes. This amounts
to about 600 billion cigarettes/year sold (World Health Organi-
zation [WHO], 2008). 13% of the world’s population drinks at
least 40 g of alcohol (three drinks) per day (World Health Orga-
nization [WHO], 2010). There are nearly two billion people using
nicotine and one billion people drinking substantial amounts of
alcohol.
The amount of money involved in selling legal drugs seems not
to be carefully tracked worldwide. We know facts such as Philip
Morris International was the 14th most proﬁtable company in
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the United States in 2008, making $6.89 billion in proﬁts (CNN-
Money.com2010). TheUnitedNationsOfﬁce onDrugs andCrime
(United Nations Development Programme, 1999; Reuter et al.,
2009, p. 3) estimates that the illicit drug industry accounts for
8% of world trade, about the same size as the oil and gas industry
or world tourism. Drugs that impinge on the SEEKING system
have many customers.
How lethal and morbid are drugs and alcohol? Worldwide
tobacco accounts for 9% of all deaths, 18% in high income
(>$10,000 US) countries (World Health Organization [WHO],
2010). Alcohol causes 4% of deaths worldwide, 2% in high income
countries (World Health Organization [WHO], 2010). Alcohol is
the #3 leading global risk for burden of disease behind starvation
and unsafe sex, and tobacco is #5 (World Health Organization
[WHO], 2010). Cigarettes kill about half of the persons who use
them (World Health Organization [WHO], 2008), which adds up
to 443,000/year in the United States (Centers for Disease Control
[CDC], 2009) and about four million/year in the world (World
Health Organization [WHO], 2008).
How would we account for this apparently “irrational” eco-
nomic activity? The SEEKING system of cigarette smokers has
been captured by nicotine. If a seller can induce a potential victim
to expose their brain to an addictive drug a few times, the alter-
ation in the drive pathway will make the person want the addictive
drug despite the danger. For this reason, purveyors of addictive
drugs use a sophisticated psychological understanding of ideal-
ization and splitting to attract and manage their customers. For
example, the nephew of Sigmund Freud, Edward Bernays, and one
of the founders of American psychoanalysis, A. A. Brill, went to
work for American tobacco companies in the 1920s to help with
campaigns to attract new populations to the smoking of cigarettes
(Brandt, 2007).
Many smokers say that they don’t want to smoke, even though
they show that they do want to smoke. Whose will are they fol-
lowing? The addicted person is following the will of the seller.
While the smoker knows they cannot possibly beneﬁt from their
addictive behavior, the entire industry of production, marketing,
and sales beneﬁts enormously. This is true of any industry that
produces a chemical that becomes urgently wanted by altering the
drive pathway; whether a government deems that chemical legal
or illegal.
Wemay be attracted tomany people, but wemake relationships
based on cathexis. We fall in love with people who can meet our
needs; conscious or otherwise. Love is irrational. The addictive
drug industry is successful by capturing the will and the cathexis
of its victims.
This information is of value in combating addiction. Public
health initiatives informed by concepts such as the capture of will
and cathexis, idealization of drug use, and the ﬁnancial conse-
quences of having a commodity with these properties, would lead
to much different behavior by governments. For example, the
addictive drug industry might be nationalized to divert money
away from those who proﬁt by deceptive advertising to teenagers,
and to properly inform the public about how addictive drugs work
in the brain to produce bizarre behaviors. It is more desirable
from a harm reduction standpoint to have heroin sold in state
stores by drug counselors than by gangs on the street with guns.
It is more desirable from a harm reduction standpoint to have
methamphetamine proﬁts go to government revenues than drug
cartels.
Finally, returning to the idea of the homology of the way that T.
gondii controls the brain of the rat, and theway that protagonists of
the addictive drug industry control the brain of the addicted cus-
tomer, we notice that in both cases there are examples of random
collateral damage. Toxoplasmosis is an important human disease,
affecting about 1/3 humans in theworld (House et al., 2011). There
is no particular advantage for theToxoplasma to inhabit the human
brain since the organism dies there when the human dies.
There is speculation that the parasite expresses dopamine in the
human brain, producing in some hosts schizophrenia or obsessive
compulsive disorder (House et al., 2011). The dopamine blocker
haloperidol moves the behavior of both humans and rats back
toward normal. It completely abolishes the rat’s interest in cats
and restores their normal fear (Prandovszky et al., 2011).
It may be that while there are many individuals in the addic-
tive drug industry who consciously manipulate the brains of their
customers, there are other individuals such as physicians who
are mystiﬁed by the way their attempts to help patients with
pain or anxiety using medications in the opioid and benzodi-
azepine classes results in addictive behaviors. Patients who were
initially grateful for the help of the physician later begin to man-
ifest manipulative and hostile drug-seeking behaviors that cause
consternation in the physician. It may be that without thinking
about this process, physicians are seeding their patient population
with medications that may become urgently wanted by some who
undergo the brain change described here. This formulation about
how drugs alter the will may facilitate more careful prescribing.
SUMMARY
Combining developing concepts about the brain effects of addic-
tive drugs with psychoanalytic observations, new hypotheses
about the disease of addiction have been generated. Addictive
drugs take over the will by transiently increasing dopamine ﬁr-
ing in the SEEKING pathway. A new drive to obtain the drug
results in the formation of a series of psychological defenses that
both promote gratiﬁcation and shield the person from the anxiety
produced by addictive behaviors, the denial system. Idealization
of the drug is a ubiquitous defense. Addicted persons cathect the
seller of the drug as a result of repeated gratiﬁcation of the drive.
They fall in love with the drug and the seller/dealer.
The ﬁrst task in treating actively addicted patients involves
negotiating the split cathexis. The treater rides the line between
ignoring the addiction, and directly opposing the cathexis with
the drug/drug dealer. Clariﬁcation and confrontation are the two
main types of interpretation that are used until alcohol or drug
use ceases.
After cessation of use, the treater has to explore underly-
ing hostile/aggressive urges and dependency needs that had been
encapsulated by the addictive behavior. It is rare to see a purely
physical addiction. In most cases, the very reason that the addic-
tion was adopted has to do with an inability to use aggression
effectively to negotiate relationships and inability to depend on
people. Without a thorough exploration of these dynamics, the
patient is prone to relapse to use of the addictive drug.
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Selling addictive drugs is a huge industry in the world. Sellers
use their understanding of the psychodynamics of addiction to
capture brains. A public health approach can use the formulations
above to help potential victims understand that the drugs work by
taking over the will and causing warm feelings toward individuals
who don’t mind having their customers die.
The author has suggested a homology between the way the T.
gondii parasite takes over the will of the rat, and the way addic-
tive drugs take over the will of a person. In both instances “the
will” involves dopaminergic function. One aspect of the behav-
ior of the victim involves being willing to sacriﬁce their life to
propitiate the welfare of the parasite or the welfare of the drug
dealer.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks to Robert Gregory M.D., David Brand Ph.D., Brandon
Yeager M.D., and Akos Mersich M.D, Ph.D, who made trenchant
suggestions about earlier versions of this manuscript.
REFERENCES
Aron, L. (1999). “The patient’s experi-
ence of the analyst’s subjectivity,” in
Relational Psychoanalysis, the Emer-
gence of a Tradition, eds S. A. Mitchell
and L. Aron (Hillsdale: Analytic
Press).
Bechara, A. (2005). Decision making,
impulse control and loss of willpower
to resist changes: a neurocognitive
perspective. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1458–
1463. doi: 10.1038/nn1584
Berridge, K. C. (2004). Motiva-
tion concepts in behavioral neuro-
science. Physiol. Behav. 81, 179–
209. doi: 10.1016/j.physbeh.2004.
02.004
Berridge, K. C., and Robinson,
T. E. (2003). Parsing reward.
Trends Neurosci. 26, 507–513. doi:
10.1016/S0166-2236(03)00233-9
Brandt, A. M. (2007). The Cigarette
Century. New York: Basic Books.
Centers for Disease Control (CDC).
(2009). Available at: cdc.gov
Christakis, N. A., and Fowler, J. H.
(2008). The collective dynamics of
smoking in a large social network. N.
Engl. J. Med. 358, 2249–2258. doi:
10.1056/NEJMsa0706154
Compton, A. (1983a). The cur-
rent status of the psychoanalytic
theory of instinctual drives, I:
drive concept, classiﬁcation and
development. Psychoanal. Q. 52,
364–401.
Compton, A. (1983b). The current sta-
tus of the psychoanalytic theory of
instinctual drives, II: the relation
of the drive concept to structures,
regulatory principles, and objects.
Psychoanal. Q. 52, 402–426.
Dodes, L. M. (1990). Addiction, help-
lessness, and narcissistic rage. Psy-
choanal. Q. 59, 398–419.
Enoch, M. (2008). The role of GABAA
receptors in the development of
alcoholism. Biochem. Behav. 90,
95–104. doi: 10.1016/j.pbb.2008.
03.007
Everitt, B. J., and Robbins, T. W. (2005).
Neural systems of reinforcement for
drug addiction: from actions to
habits to compulsion. Nat. Neu-
rosci. 8, 1481–1489. doi: 10.1038/
nn1579
Fattore, L., Fadda, P., Spano, M.
S., Pistis, M., and Fratta, W.
(2008). Neurobiological mechanisms
of cannabinoid addiction. Mol.
Cell. Endocrinol. 286(Suppl. 1),
S97–S107. doi: 10.1016/j.mce.2008.
02.006
Freud, S. (1909). “Analysis of a phobia in
a ﬁve year old boy,” in Standard Edi-
tion, Vol. 10 (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan), 5–149.
Freud, S. (1915). “Instincts and their
vicissitudes,” in Standard Edition,Vol.
14 (London: Hogarth Press), 117–
140.
Freud, S. (1917). “Introductory lec-
tures on psychoanalysis” in Standard
Edition, Vol. 17, (New York: W.W.
Norton), 420–423.
Freud, S. (1920). “Beyond the pleasure
principle,” in Standard Edition, Vol.
18, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmil-
lan), 1–64.
Freud, S. (1923). “The ego and the id,”
in StandardEdition,Vol. 19, (London:
Hogarth Press), 21–23.
Freud, S. (1926). “Inhibitions, symp-
toms and anxiety,” in Standard Edi-
tion, Vol. 20, (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan), 77–175.
Gregory, R. J., Delucia-Deranja, E.,
and Mogle, J. A. (2010). Dynamic
deconstructive psychotherapy ver-
sus optimized community care
for borderline personality disor-
der co-occurring with alcohol use
disorders, a 30 month follow-
up. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 198,
292–298. doi: 10.1097/NMD.
0b013e3181d6172d
Haggard, P. (2008). Human volition:
towards a neuroscience of will. Nat.
Rev. Neurosci. 9, 934–946. doi:
10.1038/nrn2497
House, P. K., Vyas, A., and Sapolsky,
R. (2011). Predator cat odors activate
sexual arousal pathways in brains of
Toxoplasma gondii infected rats. PLoS
ONE 6:e23277. doi: 10.1371/jour-
nal.pone.0023277
Hyman, S. E., Malenka, R. C.,
and Nestler, E. J. (2006). Neu-
ral mechanisms of addicton:
the role of reward-related learn-
ing and memory. Annu. Rev.
Neurosci. 29, 565–598. doi:
10.1146/annurev.neuro.29.051605.
113009
Insel, T. R. (2003). Is social attachment
an addictive disorder? Physiol. Behav.
79, 351–357. doi: 10.1016/S0031-
9384(03)00148-3
Johnson, B. (1992). The psychoanaly-
sis of a man with active alcoholism.
J. Subst. Abuse Treat. 9, 111–123. doi:
10.1016/0740-5472(92)90077-2
Johnson, B. (1993). A developmental
model of addiction, and its relation-
ship to the twelve step program of
alcoholics anonymous. J. Subst. Abuse
Treat. 10, 23–32. doi: 10.1016/0740-
5472(93)90095-J
Johnson, B. (1998). The mechanism
of codependence in the prescription
of benzodiazepines to patients with
addiction. Psychiatr. Ann. 28, 166–
171.
Johnson, B. (1999). Three perspec-
tives on addiction. J. Am. Psy-
choanal. Assoc. 47, 791–815. doi:
10.1177/00030651990470031301
Johnson,B. (2001). Drugdreams: a neu-
ropsychoanalytic hypothesis. J. Am.
Psychoanal. Assoc. 49, 75–96. doi:
10.1177/00030651010490011101
Johnson, B. (2003a). A Neuropsycho-
analytic approach to addiction. Neu-
ropsychoanalysis 5, 29–34.
Johnson, B. (2003b). Psychological
addiction, physical addiction, addic-
tive character, addictive personal-
ity disorder: a new nosology of
addiction. Can. J. Psychoanal. 11,
135–160.
Johnson, B. (2006). Commentary on
SimonBoag’s Freudian dream theory,
dream bizarreness and the disguise-
censor controversy. Neuropsycho-
analysis 8, 33–40.
Johnson, B. (2008). Just what lies
beyond the pleasure principle? Neu-
ropsychoanalysis 10, 201–212.
Johnson, B. (2009a). A ‘neuropsycho-
analytic’ treatment of a patient with
cocaine dependence. Neuropsycho-
analysis 11, 151–167.
Johnson, B. (2009b). “Depression and
addiction,” in Depression: Treatment
Strategies and Management, Second
Edition, eds T. L. Schwartz and T. J.
Petersen (New York: Taylor & Fran-
cis).
Johnson, B. (2010). The psychoanal-
ysis of a man with heroin depen-
dence; implications for neurobiolog-
ical theories of attachment and drug
craving. Neuropsychoanalysis 12,
207–215.
Johnson, B. (2011). Psychoana-
lytic treatment of psychological
addiction to alcohol (alcohol
abuse). Front. Psychol. 2:362. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00362
Johnson, B. (2012). “Drug abuse,
dreams and nightmares,” in Drug
Abuse and Addiction in Medical Ill-
ness, eds J. C. Verster, K. M. Brady,
and M. Galanter (Totowa: Humana
Press), 385–392. doi: 10.1007/978-1-
4614-3375-0_31
Jones, D. S., Krotick, S., Johnson,
B., and Morrison, A. P. (2005).
Clinical challenge: waiting for res-
cue, an attorney who will not advo-
cate for himself. Harv. Rev. Psy-
chiatry 13, 344–356. doi: 10.1080/
10673220500250989
Kalivas, P. W., and Volkow, N.
D. (2005). The neural basis of
addiction: a pathology of motiva-
tion and choice. J. Am. Psychi-
atr. Assoc. 162, 1403–1413. doi:
10.1176/appi.ajp.162.8.1403
Kandel, E. R. (2006). In Search of Mem-
ory: The Emergence of a New Sci-
ence of the Mind. New York: W.W.
Norton.
Klein, M. (1957). “Envy and
Gratitude,” in Envy and
Gratitude and Other Works 1946-
1963. London: The Hogarth
Press.
Koob, G. F., and Volkow, N. D.
(2010). Neurocircuitry of addiction.
Neuropsychopharmacology 35, 217–
238. doi: 10.1038/npp.2009.110
Lai, S., Lai, H., Page, J. B., and
McKoy, C. B. (2000). The associa-
tions between cigarette smoking and
drug abuse in the United States. J.
Addict. Dis. 19, 11–24. doi: 10.1300/
J069v19n04_02
Meissner, W. W. (2005). “The dynamic
unconscious,” in Textbook of Psycho-
analysis Arlington, eds E. S. Person,
A. M. Cooper, and G. O. Gab-
bard. (Arlington: American Psychi-
atric Publishing), 21–37.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 545 | 10
“fnhum-07-00545” — 2013/9/10 — 15:20 — page 11 — #11
Johnson Addiction and will
Nestler, E. J. (2005). Is there a
common molecular pathway
for addiction? Nat. Neurosci.
8, 1445–1449. doi: 10.1038/
nn1578
Niehaus, J. L., Cruz-Bermudez, N.
D., and Kauer, J. A. (2009). Plas-
ticity of addiction: a mesolim-
bic dopamine short-circuit? Am. J.
Addict. 18, 259–271. doi: 10.1080/
10550490902925946
Nissen-Lie, H. A., Monsen, J. T., and
Ronnestad, M. H. (2010). Ther-
apist predictors of early patient-
rated working alliance: a multilevel
approach. Psychother. Res. 20, 627–
646. doi: 10.1080/10503307.2010.
497633
Panksepp, J. (1981). “Brain opioids: a
neurochemical substrate for narcotic
and social dependence,” in Progress
in Theory in Psychopharmacology, ed.
S. Cooper (London: Academic Press)
149–175.
Panksepp, J. (1990). “A role for “affec-
tive neuroscience” in understanding
stress: the case of separation distress
circuitry,” in Psychobiology of Stress,
ed. S. Puglisi-Allegra and A. Oliv-
erio (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers), 41–58.
Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective
Neuroscience. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Panksepp, J. (1999). Emotions as viewed
by psychoanalysis and neuroscience:
an exercise in consilience. Neuropsy-
choanalysis 1, 15–37.
Panksepp, J., and Watt, D. (2011). Why
does depression hurt? Ancestral
primary-process separation-
distress (PANIC/GRIEF) and
diminished brain reward (SEEK-
ING) processes in the genesis
of depressive affect. Psychiatry
74, 5–21. doi: 10.1521/psyc.2011.
74.1.5
Paul, R. A. (2011). Cultural narratives
and the succession scenario: Slum-
dog Millionaire and other popular
ﬁlms and ﬁctions. Int. J. Psychoanal.
92, 451–470. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-
8315.2011.00405.x
Prandovszky, E., Gaskell, E., Mar-
tin, H., Duby, J. P., Web-
ster, J. P., and McConkey, G. A.
(2011). The neurotropic parasiteTox-
oplasma gondii increases dopamine
metabolism. PLoS ONE 6:e23866.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0023866
Reuter, P. H., Trautmann, F., Pacula, R.
L., Kilmer, B., Gageldonk, A., and van
derGouwe,D. (2009).Technical Series
#6, Assessing changes in global drug
problems, 1998-2007. Rand Europe,
Available at: www.rand.org
Robinson, T. E., and Berridge, K. C.
(1993). The neural basis of drug crav-
ing, an incentive-sensitization the-
ory of addiction. Brain Res. Rev.
18, 247–291. doi: 10.1016/0165-
0173(93)90013-P
Robinson, T. E., and Berridge,
K. C. (2000). The psychology
and neurobiology of addiction:
an incentive-sensitization view.
Addiction 95 (Suppl. 2), S91–
S117. doi: 10.1046/j.1360-0443.95.
8s2.19.x
Schmidt-Hellerau, C. (2001). Life
Drive & Death Drive, Libido
& Lethe. New York: Other
Press.
Shevrin, H. (1997). Psychoanalysis
as the patient – high in feeling,
low in energy. J. Am. Psychoanal.
Assoc. 45, 841–864. doi: 10.1177/
00030651970450031101
Shevrin, H. (2003). The psycho-
analytic theory of drive in the
light of recent neuroscience ﬁnd-
ings and theories. First Annual
C. Philip Wilson Memorial Lec-
ture, Lenox Hill Hospital 9/15/2003,
New York.
United Nations Development Pro-
gramme. (UNDP). (1999).
Human Development Report 1999.
Oxford: Oxford University Press,
103.
Watt, D. F., and Panksepp, J.
(2009). Depression: an evolutionar-
ily conserved mechanism to termi-
nate separation distress? A review of
aminergic, peptidergic, and neural
network perspectives. Neuropsycho-
analysis 11, 7–51.
Wheelis, A. (1956). Will and psy-
choanalysis. J. Am. Psychoanal.
Assoc. 40, 285–303. doi: 10.1177/
000306515600400205
World Health Organization (WHO).
(2008). Report on Global Tobacco
Epidemic 2008.
World Health Organization (WHO).
(2010). Global Health Risks. (2010).
Geneva: World Health Organization.
Young, C., and Brook, A. (1994).
Schopenhauer and Freud. Int. J. Psy-
choanal. 75, 101–118.
Zhu, J. (2003). Locating volition. Con-
scious. Cogn. 13, 302–322. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2003.09.003
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
author declares that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or ﬁnancial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
ﬂict of interest.
Received: 02 June 2013; accepted: 19
August 2013; published online: 11
September 2013.
Citation: JohnsonB (2013)Addiction and
will. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:545. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00545
This article was submitted to the journal
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2013 Johnson. This is
an open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other
forums is permitted, provided the orig-
inal author(s) or licensor are credited
and that the original publication in
this journal is cited, in accordance with
accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permit-
ted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 545 | 11
